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SUMMARY
Former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed is celebrated for his defence of the province and Western Canada during the 
energy wars of the 1970s, and deservedly so. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was a formidable opponent. He was able 
and willing to use the full arsenal of federal powers to redirect soaring western energy revenues away from Alberta to 
Ottawa. For those of us in Western Canada, it is unpleasant to imagine what the outcome of this struggle would have 
been if a lesser man than Peter Lougheed had been at Alberta’s helm. 
But there is another aspect of the Lougheed legacy that is less remembered because it is less celebrated—also 
deservedly so. These were Lougheed’s ambitious economic diversification projects. Between 1973 and 1993 
(when Ralph Klein became premier), the Lougheed-Getty “forced-growth” economic diversification projects are 
conservatively estimated to have cost Albertans $2.2 billion. While former premier Don Getty got most the blame 
for these losses (as many occurred during his watch), most of these programs began earlier. Lougheed’s push for 
government-led diversification of the Alberta economy was a policy hallmark of his 1971 electoral breakthrough, and 
marked a sharp break from three decades of Social Credit laissez-faire policies.
The Lougheed-Getty diversification fiascos are of more than just historical interest. While the subsequent Progressive 
Conservative (PC) regime of Premier Ralph Klein (1993–2006) followed an explicit philosophy of “government is 
not in the business of business,” the more recent Stelmach (2006–11) and Redford (2011-14) governments have not. 
Both have embraced government-sponsored “value-added” and diversification initiatives, including the North West 
Redwater Partnership upgrader and two new endowments to provide “funding for social and cultural innovation, and 
agricultural innovation.”†
As Alberta’s fifth premier in the past nine years, Jim Prentice, takes the helm and tries to restore some stability to 
Alberta’s public finances, it merits revisiting the Lougheed-Getty experience for lessons learned. Our read of their 
record cautions against going down the same road again. While we identify several successes (e.g., Syncrude, Alberta 
Energy Company, and the ethane-based petrochemical industry), these were mostly in the hydrocarbon energy 
sector, and so contributed little to diversifying Alberta’s economy. Our analysis identifies the largest dollar losses (the 
“Dirty Dozen”), several of which suggest that failure to control costs is endemic to government-led projects. Last but 
not least, the sheer number and diversity of government-funded projects reflects an unhealthy culture of corporate 
cronyism. With billions of dollars sitting in the newly created Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund earmarked for 
“diversification” and “capital projects,” the temptation to spend became irresistible. The Heritage Fund, rather than 
serving its original purpose of a long-term “rainy-day account,” became a giant slush fund for ministers’ pet projects. 
The result is that, in real dollars, the Heritage Savings Trust Fund has a lower net worth in 2015 than it did in 1987.
By the time Klein won the leadership of the PCs in 1993, his predecessors had racked up over $23 billion in net debt. 
Klein is widely celebrated by some (and criticized by others) for the harsh budget cuts he made to eliminate the 
structural deficit he inherited. Less well known is that the Klein team also terminated almost all the Lougheed-Getty 
diversification and stimulus programs. In their stead, the Klein governments—under the leadership of treasurers Jim 
Dinning and Stockwell Day—pursued a diversification policy based on macroeconomics: making Alberta the most tax-
competitive jurisdiction in Canada. This “build-it-and-they-will-come” approach was intended to attract both financial 
and human capital. This approach has enjoyed modest success thus far, as witnessed in the growth of the financial 
services sector and the relocation of many corporate head offices to Calgary. It is clearly a lower-risk path to sustained 
prosperity than the ill-fated, government-led “forced-growth” initiatives of the Lougheed-Getty era.
† 
Bill 1, Savings Management Act, Spring Sitting, 2014, http://www.qp.alberta.ca/549.cfm?page=s02p5_14.CFM&leg_type=spring.
1REGIME CHANGE IN ALBERTA: LOUGHEED AND DIVERSIFICATION 
An airline, a meatpacking operation and a cellphone company—in a province widely seen as the 
bastion of free enterprise in Canada, these three disparate businesses once shared a surprising common 
denominator: government ownership. For more than a quarter-century, government-backed economic 
diversification was a priority for Alberta’s Progressive Conservatives (PCs). In 1965, Peter Lougheed, 
the party’s 37-year-old newly elected leader, travelled to Nova Scotia to meet with the reigning doyen 
of Tory premiers. As the president of Nova Scotia’s provincial PC party nearly two decades earlier, 
Robert Stanfield had successfully surmounted the same challenge that now faced the young Albertan: 
how to transform an anemic political organization into a party capable of forming government. It was 
not Stanfield’s political track record alone that impressed Lougheed, however. In the Crown corporation 
created by the Nova Scotia PCs to attract industry to the province, Industrial Estates Ltd., Lougheed saw 
an activist instrument befitting the economic ambitions he held for his own province.1 
Various authors have attempted to explain the psychological underpinnings of Lougheed’s economic 
policies. Allan Hustak opens his biography of Lougheed with the oft-told anecdote of a young Peter 
watching the estate amassed by his grandfather, Senator James Lougheed, snapped up one indignity-
inducing bid at a time at the government’s behest.2 Like Alberta’s own economy, the family’s estate had 
been overextended and exposed, with the Depression dramatically reducing the value of the family’s 
significant property holdings.3 Once one of Calgary’s wealthiest families, the Lougheeds were nearly 
wiped out, a humiliation the future premier of Alberta would never forget. After tracing his family’s 
financial trajectory in Prairie Capitalism, their seminal study of resource policies in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, John Richards and Larry Pratt pose the question, “Is it too fanciful to speculate that his 
family’s sudden decline during the depression explains something of his near obsession with prairie 
diversification?”4 
One of Lougheed’s enduring criticisms of Alberta’s Social Credit government was that its passive 
economic policies had kept the province chained to the production of raw, unfinished staples, including 
oil.5 Ernest Manning, the long-serving Social Credit premier (1943–1968), had eschewed province-
building through costly government intervention.6 Manning was acutely aware of the dangers posed by 
excessive government debt, having served as finance minister when Alberta was forced to default on its 
debt, the only province in Canadian history to do so. Neither Manning’s memories nor his reluctance 
were shared by Lougheed. In the words of Richards and Pratt, Lougheed was clear in his commitment to 
“an activist government to ‘sow the oil’ and steer the province’s future development.”7 Campaigning on 
the promise to diversify Alberta’s economy, Lougheed led the Alberta PCs to a majority government in 
1971, ending the three-and-half-decade Social Credit dynasty.
1 Allan Hustak, Peter Lougheed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 73. 
2 
Ibid., 9-10. 
3 
John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1979), 154. 
4 
Ibid., 155. 
5 
Barry Cooper and Mebs Kanji, Governing in Post-Deficit Times: Alberta in the Klein Years (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000), 18.
6 
Herb Emery, “1986: The Bloom Comes Off the Wild Rose Province,” in Alberta Formed, Alberta Transformed, ed. Michael 
Payne et al. (Edmonton and Calgary: University of Alberta Press and University of Calgary Press, 2006), 719. 
7 
Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, 231. 
2GETTING DOWN — AND INTO — BUSINESS 
As laid out in the May 1974 government memo “The Management of Growth,” the Lougheed 
government’s economic objective was to transition the province from “a primarily extractive economy, 
where our resources are exported for processing to other parts of Canada and the rest of the world, to an 
industrialized economy which will see further processing of our raw materials, increased manufacturing 
and … satisfying employment opportunities for Albertans.”8 Lougheed rose later that fall in the 
legislature to reiterate the government’s commitment to wean Alberta from oil and gas production, 
and to further elaborate on the government’s plan by outlining four “supplementary” goals: 1) balance 
economic growth between the province’s large metropolitan areas and its smaller centres; 2) strengthen 
small and locally controlled businesses; 3) upgrade the skills of Albertans; and 4) capitalize on Alberta’s 
natural advantages, including its tourism potential, food-growing potential, and its ability to act as a 
gateway to the North.9 According to the premier, “This basic goal [of becoming less reliant on the sale of 
unprocessed resources] and these four supplementary goals in total give us the foundation for our overall 
strategy.”10 
Diversification Through Another Lens
While the oft-stated goal of Lougheed’s diversification policies was to lessen Alberta’s reliance on oil and gas, 
many of his government’s diversification initiatives, in reality, focused on increasing the degree of processing raw 
materials. It is useful to recognize that diversification of a regional economy can also encompass three additional 
forms: industrial diversification, market diversification and diversification in the range of products produced by 
existing industries. There are many examples of Alberta companies succeeding at finding new export markets 
for their products, both with and without government assistance. Similarly, when a company can expand the 
range of products it sells, other things being equal, it diversifies and thus stabilizes its income flows. Industrial 
diversification—the attraction of entirely new industries to a province—has been the norm in Canadian experience, 
but also the least successful. Governments are attracted to this model because it allows them to take credit when 
initiatives succeed. But success is rare, and the explanation for this is straightforward: if a project were economically 
viable—i.e., profitable—the private sector would already have done it. Structural change is both expensive and 
improbable when it conflicts with market realities (e.g., distance to markets, availability and costs of capital and 
labour, etc.). Accordingly, economists counsel that government-led diversification initiatives should encompass all 
four forms of diversification and, more generally, pursue policies that expand rather than try to change the region’s 
economy. In particular, successful diversification initiatives build on the natural comparative advantages that the 
region already enjoys.
In 1972, the Lougheed government took the first significant step towards realizing its economic vision 
when it created the Alberta Agricultural Development Corporation and the Alberta Opportunity 
Company, two Crown corporations whose express purpose was to provide financial assistance to those 
unable to obtain similar support from the private sector. The following year, the Alberta government 
was granted an option for the purchase of 938,400 shares by Interprovincial Steel and Pipe Corporation 
Ltd. (IPSCO), a major western Canadian steelmaker based in Regina.11 The government later chose to 
exercise its option, acquiring a 20 per cent share of the company,12 a move it contended would help in the 
development of a provincially based steel industry. The government never followed through, however, 
choosing instead to later sell its shares. Other diversification investments made during this period 
8 
Ibid., 232. 
9 
Alberta Hansard, 1974, III, 3133. 
10 
Ibid. 
11 
“Alberta is granted an option on Ipsco shares,” The Globe and Mail, December 20, 1973, B2. 
12 
“Alberta to exercise option on Ipsco Shares,” The Globe and Mail, April 12, 1974, B1. 
3included a 10 per cent equity investment in the Syncrude project and the founding of the Alberta Energy 
Company, a public-private joint venture to initiate a capital investment program and to lessen Alberta’s 
dependence on foreign-owned oil companies.
The boldest diversification initiative taken during the Lougheed government’s first term in office was the 
purchase of Pacific Western Airlines (PWA). Lougheed feared that British Columbia’s NDP government 
was going to buy PWA and orient the airline to the West Coast — thus threatening Alberta’s position as 
the gateway to the North, one of the government’s diversification goals. To pre-empt this, the Alberta 
government bought PWA in the summer of 1974 for $37.3 million.13 Holding 99.7 per cent of PWA’s 
voting shares, the government was effectively the sole proprietor of the airline.14
The purchase set off a storm of controversy, including among Lougheed’s own MLAs, earning 
Lougheed the moniker “Peter the Red.” The promise to divest the government of the airline was included 
among the commitments in the party’s 1982 election platform.15 The PCs followed through on the 
commitment beginning the following year, selling the government’s shares (the bulk, 3.7 million, in 
December 1983,16 followed by a further 1.3 million in August 1984)17 for nearly $54 million. While it 
was an unpopular acquisition, PWA had not been a drain on the treasury. Indeed, PWA was the only one 
of Canada’s seven major carriers to turn a profit in 1982.18
THE ALBERTA HERITAGE SAVINGS TRUST FUND 
In order to underwrite its diversification efforts, the Lougheed government moved to maximize resource 
rents during its first term. In 1972, the PCs introduced the Natural Resource Revenue Plan, which sought 
to increase the royalty rates negotiated by Social Credit nearly a quarter-century earlier. Under the new 
plan, royalty rates would jump from 17 per cent of gross production to 23 per cent.19 In a move that 
angered the industry, the government subsequently withdrew the proposed royalty plan, announcing that 
future royalties instead would rise with the price of oil.20 And rise they would. 
On October 6, 1973, a coalition of Arab states, led by Egypt and Syria, launched a surprise attack on 
Israel. As they had during the Six-Day War in 1967, the Israelis successfully repelled the onslaught. To 
punish the West for supporting the Jewish state, OPEC imposed a partial oil embargo in the wake of the 
Yom Kippur War, which resulted in a staggering fourfold increase in international oil prices, from US$3 
to US$12 a barrel.21 In spite of Ottawa’s imposition of price controls, export restrictions and higher taxes 
on energy producers, prodigious oil revenues began to flow into Alberta’s coffers, a trend that would 
13 Darcy Henton, “Activist reputation earned over decades,” Calgary Herald, September 15, 2012, A2.
14 
Douglas F. Stevens, Corporate Autonomy and Institutional Control: The Crown Corporation as a Problem in 
Organizational Design (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 55.
15 
David G. Wood, The Lougheed Legacy (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1985), 126.
16 
Anthony McCallum, “Alberta to cut PWA stake to 14.9%,” The Globe and Mail, December 6, 1983, B5.
17 
“Alberta reduces its holding in PWA, The Globe and Mail, December 18, 1984, B6.
18 
McCallum, “Alberta to cut.” 
19 
Cooper and Kanji, Governing in, 20. 
20 
G. Bruce Doern and Glen Toner, The Politics of Energy: The Development and Implementation of the NEP (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1985), 90.
21 
Ibid., 91. 
4continue throughout Lougheed’s three terms as premier.22 Between 1972 and 1974 alone, the royalties 
collected by the government more than doubled, increasing from $260 million to $560 million.23 
Alberta’s growing wealth was not without its costs. In addition to aggravating the province’s relationship 
with Ottawa and Ontario, Alberta’s other partners in Confederation feared that the rising Prairie 
powerhouse’s ability to lower taxes while maintaining high-quality public services would act as a 
vortex for investment and labour.24 The solution devised by the Lougheed government was to create the 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund. Promised during the 1975 provincial election, the Heritage Fund 
was established the following year.25 The Heritage Fund held out the opportunity for Alberta to avoid 
the pitfalls that await wealthy “petro-state” regimes. The Heritage Fund would not only save current 
energy revenues for that inevitable future day when Alberta’s non-renewable resources begin to run out. 
It would also reduce revenue volatility in annual budgeting cycles, and it even earmarked a portion of its 
investment portfolios to be invested in or loaned to other Canadian provinces. Lougheed’s creation of the 
Heritage Fund, to quote one analyst, was both “an act of statesmanship and astute politics.”26 
As required by Section 5 of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act, 30 per cent of the province’s 
non-renewable resource revenues were transferred to the Heritage Fund between 1976 and 1982, an 
amount that totaled $8.3 billion.27 Section 6 of the act detailed how its assets were to be invested: up to 
20 per cent of the assets were to go to the fund’s Capital Projects Division; a slightly smaller percentage, 
a maximum of 15 per cent, was devoted to its Canada Investment Division; and the remainder, at least 
65 per cent, was designated for its Alberta Investment Division, part of whose legislated mandate was to 
“strengthen and diversify the economy of Alberta.”28
A number of significant investments were made from the fund during this period, including Syncrude, 
the Alberta Energy Company and the Ridley Grain Terminal in Prince Rupert, B.C. The primary 
activity of the Heritage Fund’s largest investment division, the Alberta Investment Division, was 
providing financial support to a host of rapidly growing Crown corporations, including the Alberta 
Housing Corporation, as well as the aforementioned Alberta Agriculture Development Corporation and 
the Alberta Opportunity Company. 
22 
Robert L. Ascah, “Savings of Non-renewable Resource Revenue: Why is it so Difficult? A Survey of Leaders’ Opinions,” in 
Boom and Bust Again: Policy Challenges for a Commodity-Based Economy, ed. David L. Ryan (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press, 2013), 163. 
23 
Robert Mansell, “Fiscal Restructuring in Alberta: An Overview,” in A Government Reinvented: A Study of Alberta’s Deficit 
Elimination Program, ed. Christopher J. Bruce et al. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23. 
24 
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25 
Alvin Finkel, “Myths Communicated by Two Alberta Dynasties,” in How Canadians Communicate IV: Media and Politics, 
eds. David Taras and Christopher Waddell (Edmonton: AU Press, 2012), 195. 
26 
Ascah, “Savings of,” 163. 
27 
Mansell, “Fiscal Restructuring,” 24. 
28 
Bill 35, The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act, 2nd Session, 18th Legislature, 1976. 
5THE DIRTY DOZEN 
However good government-led economic diversification may sound in theory, practice often turns out to 
be a different story. And Alberta learned this hard way. By the early 1990s, the government had lost an 
estimated $2.3 billion (not adjusted for inflation)29, 30 on various unsuccessful initiatives. What follows is 
a list of the 12 most costly failed diversification projects undertaken by the Lougheed/Getty PCs. 
NovaTel
NovaTel was a joint venture between Nova Corp. and Telus’s predecessor, Alberta Government 
Telephones (AGT), to manufacture cellphones. Nova sold AGT its share for $42.5 million in 1989. The 
government began to privatize AGT, including NovaTel, the following year. While a prospectus issued 
to potential investors in AGT estimated NovaTel’s profits for the second half of 1990 at $16.9 million, the 
company was actually expected to lose $4 million, a discrepancy that became evident when German-
owned Robert Bosch GmbH began examining the company’s books with a view to purchasing a 50 per 
cent interest. The shortfall in earnings not only persuaded Bosch to drop its bid for NovaTel, it also put 
an end to attempts to privatize the company, leaving the Alberta government as the sole owner.31 The 
government finally sold NovaTel in May 1992 at a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars. Charged with 
determining the extent of the financial hit, auditor general Donald Salmon estimated the total loss to be 
between $544 million and $614 million.32 
Swan Hills Waste Treatment Plant 
In 1984, Swan Hills was chosen as the site for a plant to process hazardous waste. Three years later, 
the doors opened on this joint venture between the provincial government and Bovar Inc. The plant’s 
ownership was split 60-40 between Bovar and the government. From the outset, the plant operated 
well below capacity. Figures for 1994, for instance, showed that Swan Hills was only operating at 46 
per cent capacity, raising the question of whether Swan Hills was pricing itself out of the market. A 
subsequent study found that this is precisely what happened.33 The government’s contract with Bovar 
had no incentives for Bovar to control either capital or operating costs. In fact, the opposite was true. As 
the contract guaranteed Bovar a minimum rate of return on capital investment, Bovar had an incentive 
to overbuild. And it did. The larger its capital investment, the larger its profits. In 1995, the Klein 
government, which had inherited the project from Getty, chose to bail out at a cost $147.5 million ($80 
million to cover a loan and another $67 million to cover the operations and the rate of return promised 
to Bovar). In total, the auditor general estimated that the government spent at least $440 million on the 
ill-fated project.34 
29 
Mark Milke, Tax Me, I’m Canadian: How Politicians Spend Your Money (Calgary: Thomas and Black, 2002), 197.
30 
The source of this figure is the Canadian Taxpayers Federation. Using 15 years of the Alberta Public Accounts (1980–1995), 
the organization arrived at the sum by adding the losses incurred on the “Dirty Dozen” and other, smaller diversification 
failures. Although other figures have periodically appeared (e.g., in his book, Ralph Could Have Been a Superstar: Tales 
of the Klein Era, Rich Vivone claims the total amount lost was $5 billion. He does not however explain how he arrived at 
this figure), the $2.3-billion figure has been widely accepted in the media and cited in academic sources, including Robert 
Mansell’s article “Fiscal Restructuring in Alberta: An Overview.” 
31 
John Howse, “A costly wrong number,” Maclean’s, July 20, 1992, 38.
32 
Canada. Alberta. Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General on NovAtel Communications Ltd. 
(Edmonton, AB: 1992), 110. 
33 
Jack M. Mintz, “An Evaluation of the Joint Venture Agreement Establishing the Alberta Special Waste Management 
System,” October 17, 1995. 
34 
Canada. Alberta. Office of the Auditor General, Annual Report of the Auditor General 1994-95 (Edmonton, AB: 1995), 12. 
6Lloydminster Bi-Provincial Upgrader
In the late 1980s, the Getty government announced a joint venture between Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
the federal government and Husky Oil to produce 46,000 barrels of crude oil per day from bitumen 
reserves in the two provinces. Alberta’s initial investment was announced as $305 million, which would 
come from the Alberta Investment Division of the Heritage Fund, for which the province would receive 
a 24 per cent participating interest.35 In the end, the province spent $404 million on capital costs and 
cost overruns.36 Alberta spent a further $19.3 million on operating costs. Seeing no end to the losses 
associated with the upgrader, Alberta and Ottawa struck a deal in 1994 to sell their shares back to the 
other two partners in the project for a fraction of what they had already invested.37 From its multi-
million-dollar investment, Alberta received a paltry $32 million.38 Four years later, Saskatchewan sold 
its shares to Husky for $310 million, recouping the province’s entire investment.39 
Millar Western Pulp Ltd. 
Although investments were made under Lougheed to bolster Alberta’s nascent forestry industry, his 
successor took government-backed support to the next level, leading one commentator to note that the 
sector was the “centrepiece of the Getty-era diversification efforts.”40 In 1987, the Getty government 
used the Alberta Investment Division of the Heritage Fund to provide a $120-million loan to Millar 
Western Pulp Ltd. The government loan was to help finance the construction of a $204-million pulp 
mill, which the government touted as being “the world’s largest and most technologically advanced 
bleached chemithermo-mechanical (CTMP) mill.”41 The province had known as early as 1994 that Millar 
Western was in trouble, when it wrote off some of the interest it was owed. By 1997, the pulp mill had 
only returned a profit during one year. In April of that year, the government announced it was writing off 
a $272-million loan (both principal and interest) to Millar Western Pulp in exchange for a $27.8-million 
payment from the company. Even though the initial loan had been made a decade earlier, the government 
had not received a dime in repayment.42 
Gainers 
Arguing that his meatpacking plant was uncompetitive, flamboyant Edmonton entrepreneur Peter 
Pocklington moved to replace his unionized employees with lower-paid workers from the ranks of 
the province’s unemployed.43 A tumultuous six-month strike ensued over the summer and fall of 
1986. Desperate to push the story from the headlines, Premier Getty stepped into the fray, offering 
35 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report 1988-89 (Edmonton, AB:  
1989), 12.
36 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report 1994-95, (Edmonton, AB:  
1995), 28.
37 
Barrie McKenna and Cathryn Motherwell, “$1-billion oil stake abandoned: Ottawa, Edmonton Walk away from plant 
gushing losses,” The Globe and Mail, August 5, 1994, A1.
38 
Janice MacKinnon, Minding the Public Purse: The Fiscal Crisis, Political Trade-Offs, and Canada’s Future (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 94.
39 
Ibid., 95.
40 
George Koch, “Getty returns as quarterback and fumbles nearly every ball,” in Alberta Takes the Lead: 1984-2000, ed. Paul 
Bunner (Edmonton: History Book Publications Ltd., 2003), 36.
41 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report 1987-88 (Edmonton, AB:  
1988), 10.
42 
Steve Chase and Daryl Slade, “Province writes off $259.2M,” Calgary Herald, April 2, 1997, A1.
43 
Emery, “1986: The Bloom,” 717.
7Pocklington a government-guaranteed loan in return for settling the strike.44 In its bid to keep the 
meatpacker afloat, the province made a total of $134 million in loans and loan guarantees.45 Its efforts, 
however, were for naught. Three years later, Gainers defaulted on its loans, and the government found 
itself in the meatpacking business. After running the company at a loss, the province eventually sold 
Gainers to Burns Foods Ltd. The provincial auditor general determined the province’s total loss at $209 
million in total.46
Magnesium Company of Canada
In 1988, the Getty government guaranteed a $103-million loan for the Magnesium Company of Canada 
(MagCan) to build a new smelter in High River, which the premier referred to as the “jewel” of his 
government’s economic diversification program.47 
Soon after the smelter’s completion, world magnesium prices plunged, the smelter developed technical 
problems, and MagCan walked away from it, leaving taxpayers with a massive loan and an idle facility. 
For a number of years, the government tried to sell the plant to any company that would operate it, and 
at one point considered selling it off piece by piece.48 In addition to the loan guarantee, the province also 
had to pay ongoing expenses of $1 million a month in additional interest and maintenance payments.49 
The Klein government eventually offloaded the plant to Alberta Natural Gas Co. Ltd. for less than $5 
million.50 In total, the province lost $164 million on the development of this “jewel.”51
Prince Rupert Grain Terminal (Ridley Grain Ltd.) 
In 1982, the provincial government announced $106.3 million in funding from the Alberta Investment 
Division of the Heritage Fund for the construction of a grain terminal in Prince Rupert.52 Completed 
in 1984, the terminal was the single largest grain installation of its kind in the country, increasing the 
capacity of Canada’s westbound grain transportation by 25 per cent.53 The terminal, however, has never 
fulfilled its promise. Despite a throughput capacity of seven million tonnes, the facility averaged just 3.8 
million tonnes annually (from a low of 1.1 million tonnes in crop year 2001–02 to a high of 5.3 million 
tonnes in 1991–92) between 1990 and 2012. The money owed by the terminal is one of the last big 
government business loans still on the province’s books, with $161 million still outstanding at the end of 
fiscal year 2013.54
44 
Ibid.
45 
“High-risk assistance,” Calgary Herald, September 11, 2004, p. A20. 
46 
Canada. Alberta. Office of the Auditor General, Statement of Loss To The Province From Its Involvement With Gainers Inc. 
(Edmonton, AB: 1994), 1. 
47 
“Another boondoggle that won’t die: Getty’s MagCan investment will be liquidated for 2% of its cost,” Western Report, 
January 16, 1995, 12. 
48 
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49 
Tom Arnold, “Bleeding stopped, gov’t says; MagCan a $164.3M loss,” Edmonton Journal, April 29, 1995, A1. 
50 
Anthony Johnson, “Alberta Natural Gas set to back Magcan,” Calgary Herald, April 29, 1995, A1.
51 
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52 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report 1982-83 (Edmonton, AB:  
1983), 21-23.
53 
Oliver Bertin, “Prince Rupert terminal largest in country,” The Globe and Mail, November 26, 1984, B6.
54 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury Board and Finance, 2014-17 Fiscal Plan (Edmonton, AB: 2014), 144. 
8Alberta Pacific Forest Industries (Al-Pac) 
In 1991, the Getty government provided financial backing to the three companies (Crestwood Forest 
Industries Ltd., Kanzaki Paper Canada Ltd. and MC Forest Investment Inc.) behind the Alberta Pacific 
pulp mill complex near Athabasca. An annual production capacity of 496,000 tonnes was projected for 
the project. Touting the project as “one of the largest capital investments that Alberta has attracted in the 
past decade,”55 the government made a total of $250 million in loans to the three companies, from the 
Alberta Investment Division of the Heritage Fund. The government began negotiating with Al-Pac in 
the summer of 1997 after the company said poor pulp prices prevented it from making interest payments 
on the loan.56 The following year, the Klein government announced it would write off $155 million in 
interest owed by the mill partners in exchange for the return of the $250 million it had loaned the mill.57 
Chembiomed
The University of Alberta launched the medical-research firm with the support of government loans 
in 1977.58 The government later purchased a majority of the company, which would go on to become 
involved in areas such as organ transplant drugs and pharmaceuticals to fight HIV. After taking initial 
steps to wind the money-losing company down in late 1991, the government chose to cut its losses 
four years later under Klein, paying off the $13.2 million in outstanding debt rather than continuing to 
build up interest charges. This money was in addition to the more than $30 million the government had 
pumped into the company, including writing off $19 million in shares, paying off a $3.7-million loan and 
spending another $8 million to wind the company down, placing the government’s total loss at nearly 
$44 million.59
Canadian Commercial Bank 
In fiscal 1981–82, the government purchased $5 million in corporate debentures of the Edmonton-
based Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB).60 The investment reflected Lougheed’s desire to establish 
a homegrown financial sector. The bank found itself in financial difficulty shortly after its founding 
in 1975, making a series of bad loans to companies in the real estate, energy and construction sectors. 
Despite a rescue plan involving the province, Ottawa, and six chartered banks, the bank collapsed in the 
fall of 1985. When the dust had settled on the largest bank failure in Canadian history,61 the CCB debacle 
was estimated to have cost Alberta taxpayers $56 million.62 
55 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report 1991-92 (Edmonton, AB: 1992), 14.
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9Northern Lite Canola
In 1973, Lougheed’s agriculture minister, Dr. Hugh Horner, put his support behind a co-operative’s 
proposal to build a canola-crushing plant in Sexsmith to improve market access for producers in 
northern Alberta.63 Initially slated to cost $5 million with a maximum of $2 million coming from 
government loan guarantees, the plant’s price tag had ballooned to $14 million by the time construction 
was completed in 1977,64 with the government’s total stake sitting at about $11 million ($6 million 
in loan guarantees and another $5 million in guarantees on farmers’ equity in the project).65 This 
inauspicious start was followed by years of poor management that eventually landed the company in 
receivership in 1985. In addition to the loss of the farmers’ investments, the failure cost the government 
about $34 million in loan guarantees gone bad.66 Undeterred, the Getty government paid $8.6 million 
to get Northern Lite out of receivership two years later, placing the company under the control of a 
government agency, Alberta Terminals Ltd. The company, however, continued to flounder. In addition 
to the millions already lost, the province now had to pick up the tab for the losses incurred after Alberta 
Terminals Ltd. similarly failed to turn a profit. The Klein PCs eventually sold the operation to Canola 
Industries Canada for $6 million in 1994.67 In just under two decades, the poorly conceived and ineptly 
run plant cost the province roughly $50 million.68 
General Systems Research 
General System Research was a company specializing in industrial laser technology. The provincial 
government chose to bolster the prospects of this “recognized world leader” with $30.6 million in 
loans, loan guarantees, and share purchases beginning in 1983.69 Despite generous government support, 
General System Research went bankrupt in 1990. Attributing the company’s failure to a lack of private 
investment, the government’s minister for technology and research, Fred Stewart, conceded it was highly 
unlikely that the province would recover any of its money. Unfortunately for the taxpayers of Alberta, he 
was right.
THE (QUALIFIED) SUCCESSES
Not every project and program undertaken in the name of economic diversification by the Lougheed 
and Getty governments ended in failure. What follows is a summary of six initiatives that ultimately 
benefitted the provincial economy. What is noteworthy however, is that four of the six are directly 
linked to Alberta’s hydrocarbon energy sector. In other words, they built on comparative advantages that 
Alberta already enjoyed, but in so doing, achieved less in terms of diversification.
63 
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Syncrude 
Formed in 1964 to develop Alberta’s vast but untapped oilsands, the Syncrude consortium included 
Canada-Cities Service Ltd., Gulf Oil Canada, Atlantic Richfield and Imperial Oil. A decade later, the 
consortium had little in the way of production and revenues, but its costs had more than doubled to over 
$2 billion. In December 1974, Atlantic Richfield abandoned the project and its 30 per cent stake. With 
Syncrude on the brink of collapse, the Lougheed government played a decisive role in getting the project 
up and running, bringing in not just the federal, but also the Ontario government. The province’s initial 
10 per cent equity investment in the project was held in the Heritage Fund. As part of the deal, Alberta 
agreed to make loans to Gulf and Cities of $100 million each by way of convertible debentures.70 In the 
fall of 1981, the province later chose to convert the roughly $236 million in loan debentures into shares 
in the project.71 The province sold its remaining 11.74 per cent share in Syncrude to Athabasca Oil Sands 
Investment Inc. for $352.2 million in 1995.72 The Heritage Fund had received nearly $700 million in 
income from Syncrude before the province divested itself completely. To date, more than $14.6 billion in 
royalty payments, federal taxes and provincial taxes have been collected from Syncrude.73 
Alberta Energy Company (AEC)
AEC was created in 1973 to initiate a capital investment program and to lessen Alberta’s dependence 
on foreign-owned oil companies. Over the years, AEC’s activities included oil and gas exploration, 
pipelines, steel and coal, petrochemicals, forest products and development and investment in Syncrude.74 
AEC also held an exclusive lease in the development of the shallow gas reserves of the Suffield Block,75 
a field that turned out to be a cash cow that funded many of AEC’s other initiatives.76 Initially holding 
a 50 per cent interest, the Alberta government gradually reduced its holding before fully divesting its 
remaining 36 per cent interest in 1993.77 AEC merged with PanCanadian Energy Corp. in 2002 to create 
Encana.
The Ethane-Based Petrochemical Industry 
Capitalizing on Alberta’s “assured supply of petrochemical feedback”78 was one of the goals contained 
in the economic strategy Lougheed unveiled in the fall of 1974. While the province had been home 
to a petrochemical industry since the Second World War, it had been a small and narrowly based one. 
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The premier was determined to expand the industry by leveraging the availability, cost and security 
of Alberta’s natural gas supplies.79 Prior to the mid-1970s, virtually all the ethane extracted from the 
province’s natural gas was shipped out of the province. In 1975, the Lougheed government moved to stop 
this.
That September, Dow Chemical of Canada, Dome Petroleum, the Alberta Gas Ethylene Company and 
the Alberta Gas Trunk Line Company, wrote R.W. Dowling, the province’s business development and 
tourism minister, requesting certain commitments from the government if they built a petrochemical 
complex in Joffre, a small hamlet just east of Red Deer. The government responded promptly and 
in the affirmative.80 Through the Dowling agreement, or “Letters of Understanding,” the provincial 
government offered assurances of security of supply for ethane feedstock; a 10-year competitive-pricing 
commitment; access to required water; and equal government treatment with any future ethane-
extraction projects.81 
These regulatory incentives helped to give rise to a world-scale petrochemical industry. Private-sector 
actors spent billions of dollars building new, and expanding existing petrochemical plants in the 
province.82 In the 10-year period between 1973 and 1983, the number of Albertans employed in the 
industry nearly doubled, while the value of shipments increased from $100 million to almost $2 billion 
annually.83 Although these figures include Alberta’s oil-based petrochemical industry,84 it is important 
to stress that its ethane-based counterpart is the cornerstone of the province’s petrochemical industry. 
Alberta is home to four ethane-cracking plants, including two of the world’s largest, which together have 
an annual capacity to produce 8.6-billion pounds of ethylene.85 Over the years, the ethane-based industry 
has played an important role in stabilizing Alberta’s economy, particularly by expanding and stabilizing 
its exports.86 
Today, the province’s overall petrochemical and chemical industry represents more than 50 per cent of 
Canada’s capacity.87 Employing more than 7,800 Albertans, the industry produced over $13.5 billion in 
products in 2011, making it one of the largest manufacturing industries in the province.88
Luscar Ltd. 
In the spring of 1980, the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act was amended to create the Energy 
Investment Division. The first investment made under the division was the purchase of $25 million 
in debentures of Luscar Ltd., an Edmonton-based coal company. The proceeds went towards capital 
expenditures at three coal mines in the province: Luscar Mine (near Hinton), Coal Valley Mine (near 
79 
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Edson), and Paintearth Mine (near Forestburg).89 The loan was repaid, without incident and as scheduled, 
by December 1989. Luscar is currently the largest producer of coal in the country, owning or operating 
10 surface mines in Alberta and Saskatchewan producing bituminous, sub-bituminous, and lignite 
thermal coals.90 While the Luscar Mine closed in 2003, its processing plant is still being used to clean 
coal from another mine. The Coal Valley Mine and Paintearth Mine are still in operation. 
Bank of Alberta/Canadian Western Bank 
In fiscal 1984–85, the government spent $1.6 million to purchase 160,000 common shares of the recently 
established Bank of Alberta using funds from the Alberta Investment Division of the Heritage Fund.91 
Unlike the aforementioned Canadian Commercial Bank, the government did manage to back a winner 
in the case of the Bank of Alberta. The bank amalgamated with Western & Pacific Bank to become 
Canadian Western Bank (CWB) in 1988, and is currently the largest publicly traded Canadian bank 
based in Western Canada. 
Under Klein, the PC government repositioned the Heritage Fund to maximize financial returns on 
investments (this overhaul included discontinuing the costly practice of investing in specific projects). 
On January 1, 1997, the government created two portfolios to house the investments from the “old” 
Heritage Fund. Beginning that year, at least $100 million was transferred each month from the new 
Transition Portfolio to the new Endowment Portfolio. The government’s investment in CWB was 
transferred during fiscal 1997–98,92 with additional transfers continuing until the first half of 2002–03 
when the Transition Portfolio was wound up. As of fiscal 2010–11, the most recent year for which a 
detailed list of investments held in the Heritage Fund was made publicly available, the government held 
nearly 36,000 shares in CWB.93 
Pacific Western Airlines (PWA)
By virtue of the fact it did not lose any money, Pacific Western Airlines can also be termed a success. 
While the acquisition of the airline was highly controversial—both with Albertans and within 
Lougheed’s own cabinet—PWA did post a profit each of the years it was owned by the provincial 
government, from a low of $1.3 million in 197494 and 197595 to a high of $17.9 million in 1981.96 A hands-
off approach to the airline was perhaps the government’s greatest contribution to PWA’s success. While 
the airline was a Crown corporation, the mechanisms used by the government to control the airline were, 
in the words of Douglas Stevens, “surprisingly minimal,” consisting “merely of the appointment of three 
additional members to the board of directors of the company, and the designation of a cabinet minister—
the minister of transportation—to serve as a liaison between the Cabinet and the chairman of the PWA 
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board.”97 Following its sale in 1984, the airline continued to generate healthy profits. In 1986, PWA took 
over Canadian Pacific Airlines for $300 million, renaming the combined operation Canadian Airlines 
International. After losing money consistently throughout the 1990s,98 Canadian Airlines was taken over 
by Air Canada in 2000.
****
The dismal track record of the Lougheed-Getty diversification initiatives is consistent with—indeed 
confirms—the findings of the academic literature on what is called “forced growth.” Forced growth 
denotes government-led initiatives to use public funds—grants, loan guarantees or tax breaks—to 
attract private-sector companies to develop new companies or other forms of economic activity 
within a government’s jurisdiction. Starting with Phillip Mathias’s landmark 1971 study, the forced-
growth literature reveals a long and widespread pattern of policy failures—failures both in terms of 
the companies involved and the broader public objectives of job creation and/or diversification of the 
provinces’ industrial sector.99
The factors contributing to this pattern of policy failure apply with varying degrees of force to the 
Alberta experience reviewed in this paper.
• Such projects/policies tend to be motivated more by politics than actual or potential economic viabil-
ity. Typically, there is no high quality, independent, professional assessment of the proposed project’s 
long-term economic viability. This leads to an underestimate and/or understatement of the risks of 
the project.
• Even if a government wants to do a professional risk analysis, it typically lacks the expertise to do so, 
and is poorly equipped to ensure that the information provided by its prospective partners is accurate 
and complete. Even when it is, unequal expertise means that governments tend to be out-negotiated 
by their more experienced counterparts.100
• As a result, there is a tendency for governments to take most of the risks, provide most of the capital 
and receive little of the profits, when there are any.
• Cronyism and political connections often influence the awarding of grants or contracts. Even when 
decisions are delegated to a non-partisan, independent board or committee, those appointed tend to 
come from the local business community; are part of the “old boy network”; and/or are “drum-beat-
ing promoters” with ties to either the governing party, key ministers or both.101
• For all of the above reasons, forced-growth projects often attract private-sector partners without prov-
en track records and/or lacking in integrity, competence or financial sustainability.
• Similarly, the private-sector partners are often lacking in essential corporate business skills: account-
ing, audits, financial controls and accountability.
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The much shorter list of Alberta successes during this period is also consistent with the academic 
literature on government-led diversification initiatives.102 Four of the six—Syncrude, Alberta Energy 
Company, Luscar and the ethane-based petrochemical sector—embody most or all of the four criteria 
that should be satisfied before a government embarks on a forced-growth initiative: they all built on 
Alberta’s existing strengths and comparative advantages in the area of hydrocarbon energy extraction 
and development.
Playing to Your Strengths
In Strength in Adversity: A Study of the Alberta Economy, Robert Mansell and Michael Percy argue that governments 
should be careful and selective in their diversification approach, limiting support to projects that:
• do not offer direct market competition for existing industries in the region; 
• can demonstrate long-run viability without ongoing subsidization;
• are rooted in some clear competitive advantage in the form of access to raw materials, access to markets, 
labour productivity and entrepreneurial skill, innovation or agglomeration economies; and 
• can make use of indigenous labour and will develop extensive backward and/or forward linkages in the 
region.*
* Mansell and Percy, Strength in, 130-131.
Evidence of political cronyism influencing the forced-growth initiatives of the Lougheed-Getty era 
recently came to light with respect to the operating concession of the then new 36-hole Kananaskis golf 
course complex in 1983. The winning bid for the concession to operate the new golf course went to 
Kan-Alta, an Edmonton company that was 60 per cent owned by three associates of Don Getty, former 
minister of energy and soon to be premier. Kan-Alta’s bid failed to even make the initial shortlist. The 
company was added later, and eventually given the contract, even though it was not the highest bidder. 
The contract required Kan-Alta to pay the government five per cent of gross revenues, a rate that was 
only half the commercial rate at comparable golf courses, and no fee at all if revenues were less than 
$2 million annually. In addition, the government initially agreed to purchase all the equipment needed 
to operate the course, and then Kan-Alta would purchase this equipment from the province over a 
10-year period, without interest and at prices that would be depreciated 10 per cent a year over the 10 
years. If Kan-Alta had to purchase replacement equipment during this period, and its lease were not 
renewed, the government agreed to buy the equipment back at the original purchase price. Operators of 
similar publicly owned, privately managed golf courses in Alberta have described this arrangement as a 
“sweetheart deal.”103
While there is no way now to determine how prevalent this kind of political cronyism was during 
the Lougheed-Getty era, it seems inevitable to some degree. Elected public officials do not forget the 
supporters who helped them win elections. And in Alberta, there is considerable overlap between 
the Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta and the various business elites around the province. 
Under these circumstances, it would be surprising if personal contacts did not insinuate themselves 
into decisions about grants and loans. This is why the academic literature insists that arm’s-length, 
102 
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independent committees or boards should make such decisions.104 But even then, it is still the 
government that makes the appointments.
In conclusion, to equate Lougheed and Getty’s diversification legacy with Ridley Terminal, MagCan and 
NovaTel is unfair. There were indeed some successes. That said, the Lougheed and Getty governments’ 
efforts to replace oil and gas production with more technology-driven, less resource-dependent 
alternatives were largely unsuccessful. The economic “diversification” projects that proved successful 
were largely those that capitalized on the province’s existing strengths, and not just the Crown’s oil 
and gas reserves but private-sector expertise and capital. Forays into industrial laser technology 
and cellphones were simply no match for the economic opportunities to be had through the further 
exploitation of Alberta’s non-renewable resources, as the private sector had already figured out. If 
there are success stories to be found, they are Syncrude and AEC, not General Systems Research or 
NovaTel.105 
LOUGHEED PASSES, GETTY FUMBLES?
While the Lougheed government had taken a pragmatic approach to some of its earlier investments, 
it became increasingly interventionist in later years, churning out a number of white papers calling 
for more direct government investment to drive diversification.106 The arrival of Don Getty following 
Lougheed’s departure in 1985, therefore marked the continuation of a trend, not a departure, as is 
sometimes assumed. As Barry Cooper and Mebs Kanji colourfully argue:
Don Getty did not fumble the ball or miss an Argo bounce,107 and Peter Lougheed was not just 
lucky. In many respects their two administrations should be considered as an ensemble. Don Getty’s 
government was the Late Show of the Lougheed years.108 
For his part, Alberta’s second PC premier was perfectly blunt about his preference for government 
intervention, declaring, “Government is a large stimulator of the economy … I’m not going to wait for 
the banks.”109 And indeed he did not. 
“With the desperation of the early and mid-1980s,” notes Mansell, “the government shifted to more 
direct methods of encouraging industrial development through the provision of loans, equity, and 
loan guarantees.”110 While the risks inherent in such an aggressive approach could perhaps have been 
afforded when the price of oil was reaching historic highs in the 1970s, it became significantly less 
feasible when the price plummeted in 1986, dragging provincial resource revenues down with it, from 
$4.5 billion in fiscal 1980–81 to $1.4 billion in fiscal 1986–87.111 
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The growth of total outstanding loan guarantees is a telling measure of the government’s frenzied 
approach to diversification during this period. In 1985, the year Getty assumed office, the total amount 
of loan guarantees stood at $465 million.112 By the year he stepped down as premier, 1992, that total had 
skyrocketed to $3.78 billion,113 an eightfold increase.114 Reviewing the projects supported during this 
period, one is at a loss to discern a pattern. Be it a facility to train oil workers stationed in Southeast 
Asia, fire-retardant clothing or hockey helmets, the Getty government saw fit to support them all.115 (The 
authors’ favourite was a self-propelled tow machine that could not even be sold in Canada because it 
broke the law requiring water skiers to be monitored by at least one person.) With diversification losses 
mounting, there were few “winners” the government could point to as way of justification. 
THE KLEIN YEARS
By the early 1990s, the government’s fiscal ineptitude has reached its apogee. Through runaway 
program and capital spending, the government had amassed $22.7 billion in debt. Given that they were 
a contributing factor to Alberta’s economic woes, diversification initiatives had decisively fallen out of 
favour with the public by the time Getty announced he was stepping down as premier. Articles about 
costly failures had become ubiquitous in the pages of the Edmonton Journal and Calgary Herald (and 
even the Toronto-based Globe and Mail). With the total losses estimated to be $2.3 billion,116 Albertans 
could be forgiven for their waning enthusiasm. With its financial profligacy threatening its grip on 
power, the PC party opportunistically used a leadership change to try to get government finances—and 
its own electoral prospects—back on track. 
Ironically, it was Ralph Klein, the erstwhile reporter and populist mayor of Calgary—not the 
titans of the boardroom that preceded him as PC leader—who chose market forces over political 
micromanagement to grow the economy. After promising to embrace the financial zeitgeist of the era, 
the PC party was able to secure another mandate under Klein, and subsequently cut spending, eliminated 
the deficit (and eventually, the debt), reduced the size of government and privatized a number of services. 
The Klein government’s approach to diversification similarly comprised macroeconomic measures, 
including developing a skilled workforce, streamlining regulations and encouraging private investment 
through a lower, more competitive tax regime.117 Turning the page on the Lougheed/Getty era, the 
Klein government enacted the Business Financial Assistance Limitations Act to stop loans, loan 
guarantees and outright subsidies to business (the exception being small businesses),118 and lived up to 
its new mantra—“government is not in the business of business”—by turning off the taps on a number 
of diversification initiatives and divesting the government of its interest in a number of others (see 
Appendix 2).
After the 9/11 al-Qaida terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., the Klein government 
experienced a brief but sharp drop in oil prices—and thus, government revenues. Faced with a potential 
deficit, it responded by slashing capital spending, but also appointed a private commission to advise 
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the government on how to avoid this syndrome in the future. The subsequent report recommended the 
creation of a new savings account, in addition to the Heritage Savings Trust Fund, “to provide for a 
gradual but sustained reduction in our reliance on natural resource revenues and a focused attempt to 
build financial and other strategic assets to maintain and improve the Alberta Advantage.”119 
The following year, the Klein government amended Alberta’s Fiscal Responsibility Act to create a new 
“Sustainability Fund” that would alleviate the stop-and-go capital spending patterns of recent years.120 
Under the amendment, only the first $3.5 billion of resource revenues would be allowed to go into 
general revenues. The rest, if any, would be allocated to the new Sustainability Fund, which would be 
available to supplement any shortfalls if energy revenues did not reach $3.5 billion in a future year. The 
maximum balance of the Sustainability Fund was initially capped at $2.5 billion. 
Unfortunately, no sooner was this new savings rule created than it was broken. As energy resource 
revenues soared, the Klein government repeatedly amended the act to allow for more than the original 
$3.5 billion to be allocated to general revenues.121 At the same time, the “rules” governing what to do 
with resource revenues in excess of the $2.5 billion mandated for the Sustainability Fund were soft and 
vague. “Surplus funds” could be directed into additional savings, but they could also be directed into 
the capital account or into “balance sheet improvements,” which turned out to mean just more program 
spending. Ed Stelmach succeeded Klein as premier in 2006, and by 2007 and 2008 virtually every 
resource dollar was being spent. Following the financial collapse of 2008, oil and gas revenues plunged 
and the Stelmach government began to draw down the Sustainability Fund to cover four successive 
annual deficits. This practice continued under Alison Redford, who replaced Stelmach as premier in 
2011, until there was nothing left, and the Sustainability Fund was abolished in Redford’s 2013 budget. 
The Klein government’s reforms of the Heritage Savings Trust Fund were more successful and more 
lasting. Courtesy of the economic misadventures of the 1980s, the fund had acquired the reputation of 
being a “slush fund” by the time Klein came to office. In 1996, the government introduced changes to 
manage the Heritage Fund as an endowment fund, implementing a new governance model as well as a 
series of investment objectives and performance measures.122 The government also put an end to using 
the fund for economic-development and social-investment purposes, a routine practice under Lougheed 
and Getty. What is more, the government—after first eliminating the debt—returned to using the 
Heritage Fund as a savings vehicle, making the first deposit into the fund after a 19-year hiatus in 2006. 
In 2004, the Klein government also began the process of reforming the province’s system of investment 
management. Although passed by the Stelmach government, the Alberta Investment Management 
Corporation Act was very much the work of his predecessor’s government,123 which wanted to “politician 
proof” the administration of the Heritage Fund. The act created a new Crown corporation, the Alberta 
Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo), to manage the Heritage Fund, as well as the province’s 
other public endowments, public-sector pension plans and other funds. Operating independently from 
the government, AIMCo has professionalized the management of the province’s key assets. Its executive 
team has extensive investment, operation and risk-management experience, while the members of its 
board of directors must have “experience in investment management, finance, accounting or law or have 
served as an executive or director with a large, publicly traded company.”124 An indisputable success, 
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AIMCo is one of the country’s largest and most diversified institutional investment managers with more 
than $75 billion of assets under management.125
The Heritage Fund has long been cited as an example of what not to do with a resource-revenue fund. As 
of September 2014, the fund’s value stood at $17.4 billion on a fair-value basis.126 By way of comparison, 
Norway’s fund, which was set up nearly a decade-and-a-half later, was worth approximately $900 billion 
at the beginning of 2014. If the $9.7 billion that sat in the Heritage Fund in 1982 had remained untouched 
(and no further contributions made) and had been allowed to grow simply at the rate of inflation, the 
value would have stood at $24.2 billion in 2010.127 The problem, of course, is that the government, in 
addition to saving less than nine per cent of the province’s natural resource revenues between 1977–
2005,128,129 repeatedly raided the fund over the years to finance a plethora of spending initiatives. Indeed, 
since 1976, approximately $36.5 billion has been transferred from the Heritage Fund into the province’s 
general revenues to support program spending in such areas as health care and education (and debt 
reduction, under Klein).130 
The fund’s activist approach towards in-province investments under Lougheed and Getty has also been 
the subject of considerable criticism. Indeed, when setting up their respective energy-revenue savings 
funds, Alaska and Norway explicitly chose to avoid Alberta’s path of favouring domestic investments. 
While in-state investments are allowed in Alaska, they can only be made if the risks and returns are 
deemed to be comparable to investment opportunities elsewhere.131 In Norway’s case, investments 
from the Government Pension Fund Global can only be made outside of the country so as to ensure 
“risk diversification and sound financial return.”132 Closer to home, neighbouring Saskatchewan, which 
is contemplating its own fund, is similarly dubious of the Lougheed/Getty model. In his 2013 report 
to the government of Saskatchewan, Peter MacKinnon—after observing that the Heritage Fund “was 
less successful than it might have been”133 because of its convoluted purpose—recommended that 
investments “be made worldwide, including in the province of Saskatchewan, provided that investments 
within the province are neither privileged nor preferred in whole or in part for that reason [emphasis 
added].” 
At its outset, of course, the Heritage Fund’s in-province investment arm was intended to do just that—
prefer and privilege investments in Alberta. Even without the province’s lacklustre investment record, 
the case for doing so has never been particularly persuasive. In 2007, the Alberta Financial Investment 
and Planning Advisory Commission, chaired by Jack Mintz, recommended a “prudent investor” 
approach to Heritage Fund investment decisions, and explicitly argued against resurrecting the practice 
of using the fund to support economic diversification, maintaining that doing so would “jeopardize the 
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return on Alberta’s investments—investments that are badly needed now for provincial savings.” Despite 
having appointed this commission, the Stelmach government ignored its recommendations.
More recently, Oxford economists Ton van den Bremer and Rick van der Ploeg have repeated this 
advice. Noting that the provincial government, private companies, and individual Albertans all have 
good access to international capital markets, their advice is blunt: “[I]nvestment projects should be 
decided on their own merits and one should avoid political favoritism, rent seeking and tying the 
hands of future generations who might have different priorities.”134 They add that, not only does such 
an investment fund carry the danger of inaccurate calculations of costs and benefits, it also holds the 
potential for political manipulation.135 
In sum, the Klein government’s reforms to the Heritage Fund—eschewing risky economic development 
projects in favour of maximizing long-term returns at an acceptable level of risk—are consistent with the 
best practices identified by van den Bremer, van der Ploeg, MacKinnon, and Mintz.136 
****
While the Klein government did not make “diversification” a declared objective of its fiscal policies, 
the approach it took corresponds closely with what has been described as the “shot-gun approach” to 
diversification.137 Rather than focusing on a specific sector, the shot-gun approach embraces policies that 
enhance the competitiveness of the entire jurisdiction when it comes to attracting new companies and 
new investment. These policies include investments in transportation infrastructure, competitive utility 
rates, education and worker-training programs, support for research, and competitive tax rates. As noted 
above, the Klein government put particular emphasis on the latter, by adopting a single-rate, flat tax of 
10 per cent for personal income tax—the lowest in Canada. It also reduced corporate income taxes from 
15.5 per cent to 10 per cent138 and kept the longstanding Alberta tradition of no sales tax. 
The principal advantage of the shot-gun approach is that it “allows market forces to determine the 
direction of diversifying activities…[and] unlike the forced-growth approach, [it] does not require 
governments to select ‘winners’ from among the various types of development (something which they 
may be ill-equipped to do).”139 It relies on market discipline to allow industries and/or companies that 
are not viable to fail, but supports all four forms of diversification: new industries, new markets, new 
product lines and more local upgrading of commodities. 
The disadvantage of the shot-gun approach is that it does not directly mitigate the economic instability 
facing Alberta (and other petro-states). Most of the new private sector “eggs” will still be in the energy 
“basket,” and so when oil and gas prices tank, so will both private- and public-sector revenues. For the 
government, these considerations also underline the importance of a “revenue stabilization fund” such 
as the Sustainability Fund created by the Klein government in 2003. The bottom line then is that “an 
effective diversification and development strategy would generally involve both approaches, as long as 
each is carefully focused and designed.”140 
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CONCLUSION
Writing in the mid-2000s, economic historian Herb Emery declared that the Klein years represented the 
end of the era of costly, government-led economic diversification. By the mid-1990s, oil and gas prices 
had recovered and private-sector investment was growing again. Public-sector investment, on the other 
hand, was not. 
Remarkably, despite the return of higher oil prices and high natural gas prices, public investment 
in Alberta collapsed to levels even below those that had prevailed at the time of Ernest Manning … 
Albertans rejected a return to province-building.141 
Whether this new embrace of fiscal responsibility and laissez-faire deference to the private sector will 
endure, remains to be seen. Subsequent to Klein’s departure in 2006, oil and gas again spiked to historic 
highs—as did government spending. When energy prices crashed in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, so did revenues. In a scenario eerily similar to the Getty era, the new PC government of Ed 
Stelmach began to run “temporary” budget deficits. Now with six consecutive deficits and counting, the 
PCs have burned through over $16 billion in savings in the now defunct Sustainability Fund. Indeed, if 
we count overall decline in net financial assets, the loss is even greater: from $35 billion in 2008 to $13 
billion in 2013.142
At the same time, the siren song of economic diversification are again finding a receptive ear in the PC 
government. The government is once again “sowing the oil” to drive diversification, this time with the 
multi-billion-dollar North West Redwater Partnership upgrader. Initiated by Stelmach and continued by 
his successor, Alison Redford, the construction costs were estimated at $4 billion and then $5.7 billion. 
The most recent estimate—in December 2013—is $8.5 billion, with the government of Alberta on the 
hook to cover all of this through a 30-year tolling agreement. 
Just as Lougheed had done with Proposals for an Industrial and Science Strategy for Albertans a 
quarter-century earlier, Stelmach sought to start a conversation about the government’s role in securing 
Alberta’s economic future. Unlike Lougheed, who opted for a government-authored “white paper” 
(which the premier reportedly wrote large sections himself),143 Stelmach chose to convene a blue-ribbon 
panel. The Premier’s Council for Economic Strategy—which was chaired by David Emerson, a former 
federal industry minister—was charged with charting a course for Alberta’s long-term prosperity, 
including ways of “broadening the economic base” of the province.144 In the spring of 2011, the panel 
issued its report, Shaping Alberta’s Future, which included calls for a Global Centre for Energy, a new 
institute to focus on commercially oriented research and a special investment fund, fed by provincial 
energy royalties, to lessen Alberta’s reliance on oil and gas. 
While Stelmach’s successor did not explicitly endorse the report’s recommendations, she was clearly 
influenced by its suggestion that “the Alberta government will need to decide where targeted public 
investments can enable and support private sector economic growth in high-potential areas for the 
province overall.”145 In that vein, the Redford government proposed to resurrect the practice of using 
money in the Heritage Fund for “strategic investments” in its 2014 budget. Bill 1, the seductively named 
Savings Management Act, would actually have created a new, $2-billion government-spending program 
to “provide government with the financial resources to take advantage of new opportunities, yet to be 
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determined, that may require a large, one-time investment from the province.”146 Fortunately, one of the 
first decisions of Jim Prentice’s “new” PC Government was to repeal Bill 1. 
So the question is whether the PC government’s new—or really, old—infatuation with the forced-growth 
approach to economic diversification is permanent or passing? As Alberta’s fifth premier in the past 
nine years, Jim Prentice, takes the helm, there is an opportunity to reassess these policies. The Prentice 
government is off to a good start. Redford and Bill 1 are gone. But Edmonton is again abuzz with the 
seductive narrative that government-led diversification is the key to ending Alberta’s boom-bust fiscal 
roller-coaster.
By our read of Alberta’s record, the forced-growth approach is not the path to take. The Klein 
government’s macroeconomic or “shot-gun” approach—making Alberta a tax-competitive jurisdiction 
that can attract both financial and human capital, combined with public investment in infrastructure—is 
clearly a lower-risk path to sustained prosperity. 
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APPENDIX 1: A LEGACY OF LOSS
SELECT LIST OF FAILED DIVERSIFICATION INITIATIVES
Program/Project Name Description Outcome 
Alberta Pacific Terminals In 1988–89, the Getty government forwarded a 
$12-million loan package to Alberta Pacific Terminals, 
a grain-handling facility in Vancouver.
In 1991, the company went into court-ordered 
protection from its creditors. A Hong Kong 
businessman later bought the firm’s subsidiary, 
Fraser Surrey Docks Ltd., in a deal that saw the 
Alberta government recoup a mere $2 million of its 
$12-million loan.1
Alberta Terminals As part of its effort to enhance market access 
for Alberta growers, the Lougheed government 
purchased and upgraded three federal grain 
terminals in Edmonton, Lethbridge, and Calgary.2 
It created Alberta Terminals Ltd. to handle the 
province’s grain-storage operations.
In 1991, the provincial government sold Alberta 
Terminals Ltd., which included not only the three 
terminals, but also a trackside loading facility in High 
Level, for $6 million.3 The government admitted to a 
$2.6-million loss on the sale.4
Alberta White Wood Industries and Meunier Forest 
Products
In April 1989, the Getty government guaranteed 
a $2.3-million loan for the company that owned 
Alberta White Wood Industries in Fort Assiniboine 
and Meunier Forest Products in Barrhead.5
In February 1990, the two sawmills were closed as a 
result of “banking difficulties,” leaving the province 
on the hook for the loan. 
Alert Disaster Control Alert Disaster Control was involved in a joint venture 
with the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology 
(SAIT) to build an offshore facility to train oil 
workers stationed in Southeast Asia. SAIT ran afoul 
its own board of governors, which demanded the 
administration suspend operations in the Batam 
International Training Centre, after sinking $4.7 
million into the still-uncompleted project.6
Alert Disaster Control convinced the government 
that recovering the centre’s central component, 
a barge called the Alert 1-Sri Kresna, represented 
the best change to recoup its investment (a move, 
obviously, that would forestall any chance of the 
training facility growing into a successful operation). 
In what surely must stand as an unprecedented act 
of international intrigue for a provincial government, 
Edmonton gave the go-ahead for the vessel to be 
towed into “friendlier” waters under the cover of 
darkness.7 A separate company owned by none 
other than Michael Allcorn, the man behind Alert 
Disaster Control, bought the barge for about $1.85 
million, an amount far less than the $4.45 million the 
province had sunk into the project in the form of a 
loan guarantee.8
Canadian Professional Munitions Canadian Professional Munitions was an ammunition 
manufacturer based in the small southern Alberta 
community of Raymond. 
In March 1991, the company went under, still 
owing $803,000 on a loan the government had 
guaranteed.9
Carbovan Based in Fort McMurray, Carbovan was the only 
Canadian producer of vanadium, a metal compound 
that hardens steel.
Citing losses from low world prices, the company 
suspended its operations in July 199110 with 
$5.9 million outstanding on a $6-million Alberta 
Opportunity Co. loan.11
Climate Master Climate Master was an Edmonton-based 
manufacturer of heating and air-conditioning 
systems.
In October 1990, the company went into receivership 
owing secured creditors more than $8.4 million, 
$5 million of which had been guaranteed by the 
provincial government.12
Dial-Guard An Edmonton-based manufacturer of computer 
security devices.
After defaulting on a $2.5-million debenture in 
January 1991,13 the company went into receivership. 
The company had received a $400,000 loan from 
the province in 1987, and as well as a $1.6-million loan 
from the Alberta Opportunity Company the following 
year.14 The ultimate cost to the province was a little 
more than $600,000.
Emery Apparel Canada A company specializing in fire-retardant clothing 
geared towards the oilpatch.
Emery Apparel received a $900,000 export-loan 
guarantee from the provincial government 
and a $1.25-million investment from Vencap,15 before 
entering into court-ordered receivership in May 1991. 
23
Fletcher’s Fine Foods In the late 1980s, the Getty government guaranteed a 
$20-million loan for Fletcher’s Fine Foods to expand 
its presence in the U.S. market. Fletcher’s, in turn, 
provided a loan guarantee to the American company, 
Golden Gate Fresh Foods. 
When Golden Gate Fresh Foods collapsed, the 
province was on the hook for the $13.9-million loan.16
General Composites Canada General Composites Canada manufactured pipe for 
the oil and mining industries. 
In 1989, the company went into receivership with an 
approximately $3.5-million government guarantee 
in tow.17 The NDP opposition presented documents 
in the legislature indicating the government had 
guaranteed the loan even though it knew the 
company was in financial trouble. Unrepentant, 
Economic Development Minister Peter Elzinga 
jumped to his department’s defence, arguing “there 
are failures. But that’s not to say that we’re going to 
be timid.”18
Myrias Research Corp. Myrias Research Corporation was Canada’s only 
“supercomputer” manufacturer. 
Despite receiving $30 million in funding from 
the provincial, federal and U.S. governments, the 
company went under in the fall of 1990.19 At the time, 
Myrias still owed $7.5 million on a government loan 
(the province also had $1.5-million worth of preferred 
shares in the company).20
Nanton Spring Water A bottled-water company based in the small 
southern Alberta community. 
The aptly named company shut its doors in 
mid-January 1990, offering neither notice nor an 
explanation. Not only was the government on the 
hook for a $2-million loan guarantee, it was also 
forced to write down $800,000 in preferred shares.21
Norstar Recreation Products A Calgary-based manufacturer of helmets. The company went bankrupt in July 1990 after 
receiving a $1-million loan guarantee from the 
province.22 
Northern Steel In June 1989, the Getty government silently took 
a controlling interest in Northern Steel, the largest 
steel-fabricating firm in the province. The deal was 
not announced at the time, and, indeed, was not 
made public until 18 months later. As an Edmonton 
Journal editorial indignantly noted, “Another 
government might have seen fit to disclose this 
bit of information at the time, but not the Getty 
government. After arranging a bailout worth more 
than $5 million—part of a confusing array of public 
loans, guarantees, and indemnities to the company—
the government simply and amazingly kept the news 
of the takeover to itself.”23 Economic Development 
Minister Peter Elzinga argued that while it was not 
announced, neither was it hidden. “It was just a 
matter of course.”24
Two and a half years later, the bank called its share of 
a government-backed loan for $13.5 million. Refusing 
to guarantee more debt, Elzinga announced that the 
government was pulling the plug.25 The eventual hit 
taken by the government was $11 million.26
Peace River Fertilizer In February 1987, the provincial cabinet approved the 
$6-million loan guarantee to Peace River Fertilizer on 
the recommendation of then economic development 
minister, Larry Shaben, who also happened to be the 
local MLA.27
In the spring of 1991, Provincial Treasurer Dick 
Johnston confirmed the government was in the 
process of securing assets from the company, which 
had closed its doors two years earlier owing to 
financial troubles. The bank was calling in the loan 
the government had backed.28
Ski Free Marine Ski Free Marine manufactured an automatic, self-
propelled tow machine for water skiers. 
The company failed in 1989, shortly after it received a 
$2.8-million loan guaranteed from the government.29 
The company’s failure perhaps was not surprising as 
its product was illegal under Canadian law (at least 
one person must monitor the skier).30
24
Teknica Resource Development The company had developed a computer program 
that transformed seismic data into accurate, coloured 
pictures of underground formations.31
The government injected $1.5 million into Teknica 
Resource Development in exchange for preferred 
shares in 1986. In 1989, the erstwhile “bright spot 
in the local geophysical sector” fell victim to the 
downturn in the oil industry, and was put into 
receivership.32 The company had also received a 
government-guaranteed loan of $400,000.33
Tomotechnology In 1987, the Getty government invested $625,000 in 
Tomotechnology to develop tomography, a process 
using imaging software and X-rays to interpret 
physical and chemical properties of core samples, for 
the oil, gas, and mining industries. The province also 
guaranteed a loan for the company.34
In less than four years, Tomotechnology was yet 
another entry in the Tories’ loser list, forcing the 
government to write off a $257,000 loss under 
guarantee and $800,000 of shares.35
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APPENDIX 2: DIVERSIFICATION PROGRAMS AND  
PROJECTS TERMINATED BY THE KLEIN GOVERNMENT
Program/Project Name Description Date Terminated 
Alberta Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) A Crown corporation created to provide credit to 
those in the agricultural industry unable to borrow 
from other sources.
The ADC operated until 1993, formally disappearing 
in March 1994 when the Agriculture Financial 
Services Act repealed the Agricultural Development 
Act. 
Alberta Opportunity Company (AOC) AOC provided financial and management assistance 
to small and medium-sized Alberta businesses that 
were unable to obtain similar assistance from the 
private sector.
AOC continued to operate until early 2002, at which 
point it was merged with the Agriculture Financial 
Services Corp.1
Irrigation Rehabilitation and Expansion A project to increase Alberta’s capacity for 
agricultural production by providing financial 
assistance to the 13 irrigation districts to plan, 
rehabilitate and expand their water distribution 
networks. 
Discontinued in 1995. 
Alberta Reforestation Nursery The construction and operation of a nursery near 
Smoky Lake to expand the province’s capacity to 
produce seedlings in support of reforestation. 
Privatized in 1997. 
Farming for the Future A program administered by the Agriculture Research 
Council of Alberta to promote agriculture research 
in areas such as forage crops, land use and soils, 
processing, and marketing.
Discontinued in 1995.
Vencap Equities Alberta Ltd. Seeded with a $200-million loan from the Capital 
Projects Division of the Heritage Fund, this venture 
capital company invested $270 million into 79 
companies, mostly in Alberta, in manufacturing, 
technology, consumer products and retailing 
between 1983 and 1995.2
Privatized in 1995.
Electronics Test Centre Built to support the province’s electronics industry in 
the mid-1980s, the Electronics Test Centre tested and 
certified products, as well as provided manufacturers 
with product evaluation and technical support. 
Privatized in 1994.
Microchip Design and Fabrication Facilities Based out of the University of Alberta and University 
of Calgary, the purpose of the facility, which was 
established in 1985, was to provide research and 
development support to the microelectrics industry.
Fully privatized in 1998 following a seven-year 
transition period.
Swan Hills Waste Treatment Plant An unsuccessful joint venture, initiated by the Getty 
government, between the province and a private 
company, Bovar Inc., to process hazardous waste 
In 1995, the Klein government chose to bail out of 
the project at a cost of $147.5 million (the money was 
transferred to numbered company, which extricated 
the province from the agreement with Bovar by 
paying off obligations to the company).
Magnesium Company of Canada (MagCan) A magnesium smelter built in High River, which the 
Getty government supported with a $103-million 
loan guarantee. MagCan later walked away from the 
facility. 
In 1995, the Klein government sold the plant to 
Alberta Natural Gas Co. Ltd. for less than $5 million.
Northern Lite Canola A government-backed canola co-operative created 
to improve market access for producers in northern 
Alberta.
In 1996, the Klein government sold the operation to 
Canola Industries Canada. 
1. Historica Canada, “Alberta Energy Company Limited,”  
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/alberta-energy-company-ltd/.
2. Brent Jang, “Politics cloud Vencap privatization: Inside Alberta,” The Globe and Mail, July 11, 1995, B4.
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APPENDIX 3: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIVERSIFICATION INITIATIVES
The Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority (AOSTRA)
Established in 1974 with “the object of developing systems for economically recovering oil from 
Alberta’s oil sands and heavy oil reservoirs to replace diminishing supplies of conventional oil,”147 
AOSTRA operated primarily through cost-shared pilot projects with industry. Over its 18-year history, it 
spent the equivalent of $1 billion (in 2006 dollars) on public-private projects and institutional research.148 
AOSTRA’s partnerships with industry resulted in the development of a number of other technologies 
that, in the words of the Petroleum Economist, “are fuelling the next generation of oil-sands development 
to this day,” including in situ combustion.149 AOSTRA was merged into the Oil Sands and Research 
Division of the Ministry of Energy in 1994,150 with much of its work either privatized or sold. 
Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research Endowment Fund (AHFMR)
AHFMR was established in fiscal 1979–80 with an investment of $300 million from the Capital Projects 
Division of the Heritage Fund. In addition to supporting medical research, the foundation also funded 
a technological commercialization program to translate medical research into commercial ventures. 
According to one government estimate, the market value of the foundation’s investments was $682 
million at the end of fiscal 1995.151 The Klein government added $500 million to the foundation’s 
endowment in 2005.152
147 Canada. Alberta. Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust First Annual Report/1976-77, 20. 
148 
Leah Lawrence, “If Canada is to ever have a national energy strategy, visionaries are needed to make it happen,” Oilweek, 
August 2012, 47. 
149 
“In situ: the next generation?” Petroleum Economist, July/August 2013, 5.
150 
Historica Canada, “Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority,”  
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/alberta-oil-sands-technology-and-research-authority/.
151 Alberta Treasury, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report 1994-95, 31. 
152 
Melanie Collison, “Advances result of 25 years of excellence,” Edmonton Journal, March 9, 2005, E3. 
27
About the Authors
Dr. Ted Morton is currently an Executive Fellow at The School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary. He 
recently served as Minister of Energy for the Government of Alberta (2011-2012). Prior to that, he was the Minister 
of Finance (2010) and Minister of Sustainable Resources Development (2006-2009). In 2001, he was the Director of 
Policy and Research for the Office of the Official Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons. Ted is known for 
his expertise in the energy-environment interface in Western Canada and federal-provincial relations. He holds a BA 
degree (Phi Beta Kappa) from Colorado College and MA and PhD degrees from the University of Toronto.
Meredith McDonald is a researcher and writer whose past experience includes roles with the Minister of State of 
Foreign Affairs, the Environment Minister, and the Prime Minister's Office, where she spent four and a half years as a 
speechwriter to Prime Minister Harper. She holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Calgary.
28
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
The School of Public Policy will become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and 
focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy 
and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada. 
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance 
for the betterment of our families, communities and country. We do this by: 
• Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, 
giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital 
interests both here and abroad;
• Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, 
building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps 
everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures;
• Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and 
community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions 
that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
Our research is conducted to the highest standards of scholarship and objectivity. The decision to pursue research is made 
by a Research Committee chaired by the Research Director and made up of Area and Program Directors. All research is 
subject to blind peer-review and the final decision whether or not to publish is made by an independent Director.
The School of Public Policy
University of Calgary, Downtown Campus
906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor
Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9
Phone: 403 210 7100
DISTRIBUTION
Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and 
therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, 
or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2015 by The School of Public Policy. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any 
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief 
passages quoted in critical articles and reviews.
ISSN
1919-112x SPP Research Papers (Print) 
1919-1138 SPP Research Papers (Online)
DATE OF ISSUE
March 2015
MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION
For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-453-0062. 
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The 
School's events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT
For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please 
contact Courtney Murphy by telephone at 403-210-7201 or by e-mail at 
cdmurphy@ucalgary.ca.
29
RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
WHO ARE THE HOMELESS? NUMBERS, TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WITHOUT HOMES IN CALGARY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/who-are-homeless-numbers-trends-and-characteristics-those-without-homes-calgary
Meaghan Bell, Nicole Jackson, Ali Jadidzadeh and Ron Kneebone | March 2015
THE EXEMPT MARKET IN CANADA: EMPIRICS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/exempt-market-canada-empirics-observations-and-recommendations
Vijay Jog | March 2015
BETTER OFF DEAD: “VALUE ADDED” IN ECONOMIC POLICY DEBATES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/better-dead-%E2%80%9Cvalue-added%E2%80%9D-economic-policy-debates
Trevor Tombe | March 2015
MINING TAXATION IN COLOMBIA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/mining-taxation-colombia
Duanjie Chen and Guillermo Perry | February 2015
ESPlannerBASIC CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/esplannerbasic-canada
Laurence Kotlikoff | February 2015
SHELTER FROM THE STORM: WEATHER-INDUCED PATTERNS IN THE USE OF EMERGENCY SHELTERS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/shelter-storm-weather-induced-patterns-use-emergency-shelters
Ali Jadidzadeh and Ron Kneebone | February 2015
AFTER AMERICA, CANADA’S MOMENT?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/after-america-canada%E2%80%99s-moment
Ian Brodie | February 2015
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAXES/TRANSFERS IN CANADA: A COHORT ANALYSIS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/distribution-income-and-taxestransfers-canada-cohort-analysis
Daria Crisan, Kenneth McKenzie and Jack Mintz | February 2015
THE 2014 GLOBAL TAX COMPETITIVENESS REPORT: A PROPOSED BUSINESS TAX REFORM AGENDA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/2014-global-tax-competitiveness-report-proposed-business-tax-reform-agenda
Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz | February 2015
WHAT DEPENDENCY ISSUES? RE-EXAMINING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CANADA'S RELIANCE ON THE U.S. EXPORT MARKET
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/what-dependency-issues-re-examining-assumptions-about-canadas-reliance-us-export-market
Eugene Beaulieu and Yang Song | January 2015
BENDING THE MEDICARE COST CURVE IN 12 MONTHS OR LESS:  
HOW PREVENTATIVE HEALTH CARE CAN YIELD SIGNIFICANT NEAR-TERM SAVINGS FOR ACUTE CARE IN ALBERTA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/bending-medicare-cost-curve-12-months-or-less-how-preventative-health-care-can-yield-signifi
Daniel Dutton, J.C. Herbert Emery, Thomas Mullie, and Jennifer Zwicker | January 2015
POTASH TAXATION: HOW CANADA'S REGIME IS NEITHER EFFICIENT NOR COMPETITIVE FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/potash-taxation-how-canadas-regime-neither-efficient-nor-competitive-international-perspecti
Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz | January 2015
